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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, 
: NOT INCARCERATED 
v. 
MITCHELL WORWOOD, Case No. 20060048-SC 
DEFENDANT/PETITIONER. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
JURISDICTION 
Petitioner, MITCHELL WORWOOD ("Worwood"), appeals from the Utah Court 
of Appeal's decision affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 
State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539 (Addendum C). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §7 8-2-2(3 )(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: This Court granted certiorari as to the following issue: 
Whether delay in the performance of a field sobriety test and transportation of a 
suspect may be justified by the inability of an officer to immediately effectuate a 
formal arrest or by the existence of more suitable circumstances for performing the 
test at another location. See, Order.1 
lWorwood assumes that in granting certiorari on this narrow question, this Court is 
aware from the Petition that there was no evidence that the delayed performance of a field 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the court of 
appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the 
district court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. An appellate court 
reviews a district court's decision concerning the constitutionality of a search and seizure 
for correctness, applying no deference to the district court's legal conclusion." State v. 
Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, ^9 (citations and quotations omitted). Search and seizure cases 
present mixed questions of law and fact that are reviewed for correctness based on a 
totality of the circumstances. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^|8, 122 P.3d 506. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In September 2003, Worwood was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol with two prior convictions, a third degree felony (Rl). A preliminary hearing was 
conducted on December 12, 2003 (R91), and a hearing on Worwood's subsequent motion 
to suppress evidence was conducted on February 6, 2004 (R92). The trial court denied 
Worwood's Motion to Suppress Evidence (R24) in its Ruling dated April 13, 2004 (R60; 
Addendum A). On June 2, 2004, Worwood entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to 
State v. Sery, 788 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R75), and was sentenced on July 20, 2004 
sobriety test was the result of either the officer's inability to effectuate a formal arrest or 
because conditions at the stop were unsuitable. The officer in this case could have 
effectuated the arrest, conditions were suitable, but performing a test would have 
inconvenienced the officer. He testified that he did not perform the test because "I didn't 
want to" and because he did not want to "mess up" his night (R92:10-14). However, the 
question of whether a delay might be justified under the narrow circumstances outlined in 
this Court's Order appears to be one of first impression in Utah. 
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(R77). Worwood timely filed his Notice of Appeal on August 13, 2004 (R81). 
On appeal Worwood argued that the trial court's findings and conclusions that the 
seizure of Worwood was only a level two encounter were incorrect based on the record 
evidence set forth below, and that the officer's conduct constituted a de facto arrest 
without probable cause and was thus in violation of both article I, section 14 of the Utah 
constitution (Addendum B), and the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution 
(Addendum B). 
Noting Justice Thome's dissent, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected Worwood's 
arguments and affirmed his conviction on December 15, 2005. State v. Worwood, 2005 
UT App 539 (Addendum C). The court stated: 
"We appreciate the concerns expressed by our colleague in his dissent and note 
that Trooper Wright's mode of investigation would be permissible only in the 
rarest of circumstances and that this case ultimately turns on the unique set of facts 
it presents, albeit on a sparse record. . . . Trooper Wright testified that he was 
returning from horseback riding in a pickup truck with an attached horse trailer, 
had no means of communication, and was not equipped to make a formal arrest.2 . . 
. Although Trooper Wright may have been able to perform a sufficient field 
sobriety test on Worwood at the point of the initial encounter in Deep Canyon and 
possibly to transport him to the Juab County Jail, it was not unreasonable for him 
to drive Worwood to a nearby location in the town to permit an on-duty officer to 
perform a field sobriety test and, if necessary, effect a formal arrest. . . . Finally, 
there is no evidence that the change of location significantly extended the 
encounter, and the record gives no indication that under these unique 
circumstances Trooper Wright was motivated by any purpose other than quickly 
and effectively resolving his suspicion that Worwood was intoxicated."3 Id. at J^9. 
2Trooper Wright testified that he could have made an arrest. See, fn. 1, supra. 
3The record tells a different story. Citing the record in his dissent, Justice Thorne 
noted, "[The officer].. .did not want to 'mess [] up [his] night' by incurring the 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 20, 2004, Utah Highway Patrol trooper, Cory Wright ("Wright" or 
"Trooper Wright"), who was off duty (R92:4), and his friend, Skyler Fautin ("Fautin") 
(R92:10), were driving an unmarked vehicle out of Deep Canyon in Juab County where 
they had been riding horses (R92:5). Wright testified that he observed a white truck 
parked on the road, a wet spot on the road, and a partially crushed beer can near the wet 
spot (R92:5). Worwood, who had been standing near his truck, entered the truck and 
moved it to the side of the road to allow Wright to pass (R92:5-6). Wright did not 
observe any unusual driving pattern by Worwood (R92:6). 
Wright testified that his law enforcement job "kicked in" (R92.7), so he stopped, 
rolled down his passenger window, and without identifying himself as a police officer 
although Worwood knew he was (R92:15), asked Worwood if he was okay (R92: 6-7). 
Worwood responded "Yeah" and said that he had stopped to relieve himself (R92:7). 
Wright testified, "The way [Worwood] was talking, he was talking slow, slurred. He had 
bloodshot eyes that you could see and so I got out of my vehicle at that point once I talked 
to him a little bit, I felt like, hey, maybe I'll - 1 need to get next to this guy. He appears to 
be intoxicated, have alcohol in his - " (R92:7). 
Wright did not smell the odor of alcohol at this time, the only indicia of drinking 
responsibility for Worwood's potential arrest and its accompanying paperwork. Instead, 
he wanted to hand off the situation to a fellow officer. State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 
539, fn. 4. 
4 
being bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, which Wright admitted could have been caused 
by something other than intoxication (R92:13). However, Wright testified that based on 
these two observations, he refused to allow Worwood to drive his vehicle and Worwood 
was not free to leave (R92:15). Wright testified that he intended to take Worwood into 
custody at this point based solely on his slurred speech and bloodshot eyes (R92-13-16) 
Wright made Worwood exit his vehicle; he was "not going to let [Worwood] drive 
until a Trooper looked at him" (R92:13). As Worwood complied, Wright did not smell 
alcohol nor did he observe any staggering, body sway, or other indicia of intoxication 
(R92:9-10). Wright could have performed field sobriety tests on Worwood at the stop but 
refused to do so because "I didn't want to" (R92:10-11, 14). He testified, 'it would have 
messed up my night" because it "would have been my arrest" (R92:10, 16). Therefore, 
for this reason alone, Wright opted to seize Worwood and transport Worwood to Wright's 
private residence (R92.TO, 14). 
Wright seized Worwood's truck, took Worwood into custody and transported him 
in Wright's truck to Wright's private residence, about a mile and a half away (R92:10). 
Wright first detected the odor of alcohol after taking Worwood into custody and upon 
getting into the truck with Worwood (R92: 9). Wright directed Fautin to follow in 
Worwood's truck (R92.T0). Some unknown time later, Utah Highway Patrol trooper 
Kevin Wright (Cory Wright's brother) responded to Trooper Wright's home, conducted 
field sobriety tests and transported Worwood to the Juab County Jail (R91:17). 
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The foregoing record facts are not disputed. Although the trial court erroneously 
suggested in its findings denying Worwood's motion to suppress evidence that Trooper 
Wright may have detected the odor of alcohol prior to entering Wright's truck with him, 
and further speculated that perhaps the canyon road was not a suitable place to conduct 
field sobriety tests (R60; Addendum A), these assertions are contrary to the record set 
forth in detail above, which record was not disputed below. Trooper Wright testified that 
he was capable of conducting field sobriety tests at the time of the stop, but that he simply 
did not want to (R92:10-14). He also testified that he did not detect the odor of alcohol 
until after he entered his truck and after taking Worwood into custody (R92:9). As 
Justice Thorne stated in his dissent, "The only competent evidence of the events 
surrounding Worwood's encounter with Wright was Wright's testimony at the 
suppression hearing." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, [^14 (J. Thorne, dissenting). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT "IT WAS NOT 
UNREASONABLE" FOR THE OFFICER TO TRANSPORT WORWOOD 
TO ANOTHER LOCATION FOR FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS, WHEN THE 
OFFICER COULD HAVE PERFORMED THE TESTS AT THE 
LOCATION OF THE STOP, IS INCORRECT. 
A. The officer's conduct was a de facto arrest and violated article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Worwood argued below that the officer's conduct violated both the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See, BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT ("Br. Appt.") at 5-10. This continues to be Worwood's position. 
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However, based upon guidance from this Court, article I, section 14 provides 
greater uniformity of search and seizure law than does the Fourth Amendment, thereby 
offering both greater privacy protections to Utah citizens and more practical guidance for 
law enforcement in an area that is growing increasingly complex and inconsistent under 
Fourth Amendment analysis. Accordingly, Worwood expressly requests this Court to 
review the issue raised herein under article I, section 14. 
Several years ago this Court noted, "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a 
somewhat different construction [than the Fourth Amendment] may prove to be an 
appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the federal courts." State v. Larocco, 
19A P.2d 460, 465 (1990) (citing numerous other state courts holding that their own 
constitutions provided greater protection to their citizens than the Fourth Amendment 
does) (quoting State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, n.8 (Utah 1988).4 
More recently, this Court stated, "article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, Ifl 1 (further 
quoting Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Larocco that "this Court should be both 
4See also, State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (concurring opinion of 
Stewart, Justice, and concurring and dissenting opinion of Durham, Justice, stating that 
this Court "should not be bound to construe Utah Constitutional provisions in light of 
federal law," and that a "contingent relationship between Utah's constitution and the 
federal. . . [has not been] adopted by this [C]ourt" and "should never be"). 
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the ultimate and final arbiter of the meaning of the provisions of the Utah Declaration of 
Rights and the primary protector of individual liberties")- Id. at ^[13. In Brigham City, 
this Court was particularly concerned that the result of a lack of analysis under article I, 
section 14 might be "a de facto abdication of [this Court's] responsibility as guardians of 
the individual liberty of our citizens". Id. at 1J14;5 State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \\2 
(Utah 2005) (noting that article I, section 14 provides greater protections to citizens than 
the Fourth Amendment). 
Applied to the facts in this case, as an initial matter this Court has formally taken 
the position that "warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent 
circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained." Larocco at 470 (citation 
omitted). Exigent circumstances may exist when there is a threat of physical harm or 
destruction of evidence. See, Brigham City ^28-44. However, Worwood and his truck 
were seized in this case not because of exigent circumstances, but because Trooper 
Wright decided to pass Worwood off to another officer - because he was off-duty and did 
not want to conduct field sobriety tests (R92:10-14). Hence, Worwood was seized on the 
basis of "probable inconvenience." 
Officer inconvenience, the only reason given in this case for seizing Worwood and 
transporting him to another location, is not recognized as an exigent circumstance 
5See also, State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699, 703 (Utah 2004), wherein this Court 
addressed similar concerns. 
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justifying a warrantless seizure - under either federal or state law Thus, the warrantless 
seizure of Worwood was a de facto arrest not supported b> probable cause and in 
violation of both article I, section 14, and the Fourth Amendment6 
However, in granting certiorari in this case, this Court ordered analysis of whether 
an officer's inability to immediately effectuate a formal arrest, or more suitable conditions 
at a different location, might justify a delay (i.e., transporting the defendant) in 
conducting field sobriety tests. 
Initially, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where an officer would ha\e the 
ability to transport an individual to another location if the officer truly was unable to 
effectuate a formal arrest at the scene of the stop In Utah, "an arrest is an actual restraint 
of the person arrested or submission to custody " Utah Code Ann §77-7-1 
The evidence in this case is that Worwood submitted himself to custody, I e., was 
arrested. A de facto arrest also occurs when the events are indistinguishable from an 
arrest. See, Dunaway v New York, 442 U S 200, 212 (1979) (explaining that the taking 
6See e g, State v Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f36, 63 P 3d 650 ("A level three 
encounter involves an arrest, which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy 
detention that requires probable cause ") (quotations and citations omitted) State v 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (twan officer may seize a person 
if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'") (citations omitted), Salt Lake City v 
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, P10 (same); State v Chism, 2005 UT App 41, f 12 ("Officers must 
diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, and it is unlawful to continue the detention after reasonable suspicion 
is dispelled.") (citations and quotations omitted). 
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of a murder suspect to the police station for investigative purposes was not merely an 
investigative detention, but was an arrest). 
However, if an officer was faced with an uncooperative suspect who resisted 
efforts to transport him to another location based solely on reasonable suspicion, the 
suspect would either escape (if the officer truly was unable to effectuate an arrest) or ha\e 
to be actually restrained in order to transport him safely. Moreover, he would be subject 
to lawful arrest for resisting, thereby making the issue of delay moot in the case of a 
resisting suspect. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) (holding that resisting 
even an unlawful seizure is itself a crime under the applicable statute). 
Thus, the only context in which the question of a delayed investigative detention 
could apply is one involving a cooperative suspect. But under Utah law, a suspect is 
arrested when he submits himself to custody; so an officer always has the means of 
arresting a cooperative person. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-1. Therefore, there is no situation 
where an officer, acting solely on the basis of reasonable suspicion, cannot effect an 
arrest. If the suspect resists, the officer has probable cause and the issue is moot; if the 
suspect submits himself to custody, the officer has the means to arrest. The fact that an 
officer may lack means of communication or handcuffs should not diminish constitutional 
protections, including requirements for establishing probable cause prior to arrest. 
Further, the real problem with giving law enforcement a license to transport 
individuals during a purported investigative detention to a "more suitable location," is the 
10 
slippery slope inherent in the definition of "more suitable." This case presents a good 
example of how "more suitable" would be open to subjective interpretation and abuse. 
Here, an off-duty officer "didn't want to" (R92:11) be bothered with conducting field 
sobriety tests and the paperwork consequent to an arrest. Hence, "more suitable*' was 
defined by officer whim and convenience. 
As this case demonstrates and completely opposed to article I, section 14 as 
defined by this Court, a license to transport suspects to a "more suitable" location would 
expand the scope of an investigative detention, invite creative and subjective speculation 
and interpretation of the term "more suitable," and thereby diminish the rights of citizens. 
Thus, the practical result of the court of appeals' decision is that it directly 
undermines the protections provided by article I, section 12. It diminishes citizens' rights 
by allowing them to be taken into custody without a warrant or probable cause. The 
decision thereby creates inconsistency rather than uniformity of the law, and obscures and 
complicates the parameters of an investigative detention such that the line between an 
investigative detention and an arrest is effectively eliminated. 
Thus, under article I, section 14, Trooper Wright's unnecessary seizure of 
Worwood exceeded the scope of an investigative detention. Trooper Wright did not want 
to be bothered with the extra work that would have resulted if field sobriety tests had 
shown impairment. As he testified, "it would have been my arrest" (R92:10, 16) so "T 
didn't want to" (R92:l 1), because "it would have messed up my night". 
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Further, the evidence obtained in this case was a direct result of the unlawful 
seizing of Worwood and his truck. It cannot be presumed that the results of the field 
sobriety tests would have been the same had they been conducted at the scene of the stop. 
There is no evidence regarding how long the delay was between the stop and when field 
sobriety tests were finally performed, during which delay Worwood's blood-alcohol level 
was likely changing. Thus, the results of the field sobriety tests were subject to exclusion 
under both state and federal law. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, "Evidence obtained as a direct result of an 
unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion. The question to be 
resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently obtained is 'tainted' or is 'fruit' of 
a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence was 'come at by exploitation of [the 
initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint.' Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun v 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). 
The evidence in this case was obtained as a result of the illegal seizure of 
Worwood. Therefore, the test results should have been excluded under both the Fourth 
Amendment and the more protective provisions of article I, section 14. Accordingly, the 
court of appeals' contrary holding is incorrect. 
B. The seizing of Worwood and his truck was similarly a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Because article I, section 14 offers greater protections than the Fourth Amendment 
12 
(Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f^l 1), it follows that conduct in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is also in violation of the Utah Constitution. Thus, a separate analysis 
of the issues under the Fourth Amendment is warranted. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, "an investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop [and] . . . the 
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available 
to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 
2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion) (cited by Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 420 (2005); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah App. 1990)); see also, United 
States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1995) (UA permissible investigative stop may 
become an unlawful arrest if the means of detention are 'more intrusive than necessary'") 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, Trooper Wright's testified that he could have performed field sobriety 
tests at the stop, but he "didn't want to." (R92:10, 14). In other words, he did not use the 
least intrusive means available to confirm or dispel his suspicion that Worwood was 
impaired, and the transporting of Worwood to another location was wholly unnecessary. 
The Utah Court of Appeals found Trooper Wright's conduct justified and cited 
United States v. Sharpe1 in affirming the trial court's denial of Worwood's motion to 
suppress. State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, ^|8. The court of appeals' reliance on 
7470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). 
13 
Sharpe is interesting, because Sharpe actually supports Worwood's position. 
In Sharpe, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that police are required to pursue "a 
means of investigation . . . likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 
686 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Supreme Court "emphasized the need to consider 
the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably 
needed to effectuate those purposes." Id. at 685; see also, Fisher v Harden^ 398 F.3d 
837 (6th Cir. 2005) ("An investigative [detention] may ripen into a de facto arrest through 
the passage of time or the use of force. If, through the passage of time or use of force, an 
investigative detention ripens into an arrest, a suspect's continued detention must be based 
upon probable cause. . . . The investigative methods employed should be the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short 
period of time) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. (1968)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals ignored all of these factors. It sanctioned a means of 
investigation that was not only unnecessary and intrusive, but unlikely to confirm or 
dispel Trooper Wright's suspicions quickly. Indeed, the court did not just ignore the 
officer's expressed purpose of promoting his own convenience in transporting Worwood 
to another location (R92:10-14), but erroneously concluded, "the record gives no 
indication that under these unique circumstances Trooper Wright was motivated by any 
purpose other than quickly and effectively resolving his suspicion that Worwood was 
14 
intoxicated." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT 539, f9. 
This incorrect factual conclusion is puzzling in light of what was argued below and 
mirrored by Justice Thome's observation from the record that u[The officer] . . .did not 
want to 'mess [] up [his] night' by incurring the responsibility for Worwood's potential 
arrest and its accompanying paperwork. Instead, he wanted to hand off the situation to a 
fellow officer." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, fn. 4. 
According to Trooper Wright's own testimony, the least intrusive means available 
to him for quickly confirming or dispelling his suspicion that Worwood was impaired was 
a short field sobriety test that should have been conducted at the scene of the stop. The 
unnecessary seizing of Worwood and his truck without probable cause and to facilitate 
officer convenience exceeded the scope of an investigative detention and thereby violated 
the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals' contrary holding is incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals created a new personal convenience exception to both 
article I, section 14, and the Fourth Amendment. In light of contradictory precedent from 
this and other courts cited herein, the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in this case is 
unhelpful to either police or prosecutors, and thus an unworkable anomaly in search and 
seizure jurisprudence. It is inconsistent and has only generated additional confusion in an 
area of the law that is growing increasingly complex. 
Particularly under article I, section 14, this new exception not only expands the 
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parameters of permissible police conduct in the context of an investigative detention, but 
it blurs the line between an investigative detention and an arrest. Moreover, it diminishes 
citizens' privacy and protections against unlawful search and seizure. Therefore, it 
abdicates those protections and adds complexity and inconsistency to an already 
complicated and inconsistent area of jurisprudence 
Accordingly, Petitioner, Mitchell Worwood, respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the Utah Court of Appeals and to vacate his conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this j/j day of April, 2006. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
C /^ 
Scott €ard/Jehnifer Gt>wans 
Attorneys for Mr. Worwood 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant 
Attorney General Fred Voros Jr., 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854, this 0 ^ day of April, 2006. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
RULING DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MITCHELL L. WORWOOD 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 031600152 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being 
fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
1. On or about June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off duty highway patrolman, was in 
the area of Deep Canyon when he observed a pickup truck stopped in the middle of the road. 
Near the truck, Trooper Wright saw a man, a wet spot in the road, and a beer can. Trooper 
Wright observed the man get in the truck and pull it over to the side of the road so that Trooper 
Wright could pass. Trooper Wright later observed a cooler that appeared to have been recently 
emptied. 
2. Trooper Wright stopped to talk to the man, who was later identified as Mitchell 
Worwood. While talking to Mr. Worwood, Trooper Wright noticed Mr. Worwood had blood 
shot eyes and slurred speech. After talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity, Trooper 
Wright also smelled the odor of alcohol. Based on these observations, Trooper Wright believed 
that Mr. Worwood was intoxicated and was unable to safely operate his vehicle. Due to this 
OiO 
belief, Trooper Wright indicated to Mr. Worwood that he was not going to allow Mr. Worwood 
to drive until he had been checked out by an officer. Trooper Wright testified that Mr. Worwood 
was not free to leave at this point. 
3. Trooper Wright did not have a telephone or other means to communicate with law 
enforcement. Due to this fact, Trooper Wright asked Mr. Worwood to ride with him in the 
trooper's truck and have another individual drive Mr. Worwood5s truck to Trooper Wright's 
house, which was nearby, in order to meet a law enforcement officer. Mr. Worwood then got 
into Trooper Wright's truck, Trooper Wright's passenger got into Mr. Worwood's truck, and 
they all drove a short distance to Trooper Wright's house. 
4. Another highway patrol trooper, Kevin Wright, responded to Korey Wright's 
house and took over this investigation. Trooper Kevin Wright administered field sobriety tests to 
the Defendant. The Defendant failed these tests, and Trooper Kevin Wright arrested Mr. 
Worwood. 
RULING 
The "right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures" is guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Generally, there are three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between police 
officers and the public: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop', (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
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617-18 (Utah 1987)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a person is not seized when a police officer 
merely approaches the person on the street and asks questions if the person stopped is willing to 
listen. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App 1987). In this case, Trooper Wright 
approached Mr. Worwood and asked what he was doing. At this point, Mr. Worwood was 
willing to listen and answer the trooper's questions. The defendant was free to leave, and 
Trooper Wright had not shown any authority over the defendant. Therefore, this Court finds that 
the trooper's initial interaction with the defendant was a level one interaction. 
A person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an officer 
deprives a person of his liberty by means of physical force or show of authority. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App 1987). Under the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be a reasonable 
basis for even a brief investigatory detention and officers must have a "reasonable suspicion, based 
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47, 51 (1979). Whether the objective facts known to the officer support a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances and in light of the officer's 
experience and training. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, while the trooper was speaking with the defendant, the trooper noticed that 
the defendant had blood shot eyes, that his speech was slurred, and that the defendant had an odor 
of alcohol on his breath. The trooper also observed the defendant's truck, an empty beer can, a 
wet spot, and an emptied cooler in the middle of the mountain road. Mr. Worwood also indicated 
to the trooper that he had stopped to urinate. These observations in totality caused the trooper to 
believe that Mr. Worwood was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was unable to 
safely operate his vehicle. 
Ruling Page 3 
The Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime and lawfully detained the defendant to 
investigate. See, State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The encounter escalated 
to a level two encounter when Trooper Wright told the defendant that he could not drive his 
vehicle until he had been checked out by another officer. The trooper also testified that the 
defendant was not free to leave at this point. 
The defendant argues that his detention became illegal when the trooper required him to 
ride to another location and wait for another trooper to conduct field sobriety tests. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Deitnian, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987). 
In this case, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the trooper to transport the 
defendant a short distance from the mountain rode where the stop occurred to the trooper's 
home. The Court finds that transporting the defendant to another location was reasonable under 
the circumstances and that it was more fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a 
location that would allow the oflficer to obtain accurate test results. Additionally, the Court finds 
under the circumstances that it was reasonable for Trooper Korey Wright to hand off the 
investigation of DUI to another trooper in that the DUI statutes allow the trooper to hand off a 
DUI investigation and the trooper's actions did not cause an unreasonable delay in the 
investigation. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant was not unlawfully detained. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendant's Motion to Suppr 
denied. 
DATED this / D day of April, 2004 
*2E2£& 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, §14 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
ADDENDUM C 
STATE V. WORWOOD, 2005 UT APP 539, 127 P.3D 1265 
LEXSEE 2005 UT APP 539 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Mitchell Worwood, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20040701-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UTApp 539; 127R3d 1265; 541 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 
553 
December 15, 2005, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Fourth District, Nephi 
Department. 031600152. The Honorable Steven L. 
Hansen. 
COUNSEL: Scott P. Card and Jennifer Gowans, Provo, 
for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros Jr., Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge. Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Judge, THORNE, Judge (dissenting). 
OPINIONBY: James Z. Davis 
OPINION: [**1266] DAVIS, Judge: 
[*P1] Mitchell Worwood appeals the district court's 
ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence taken 
during sobriety tests. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] On June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off-duty 
Utah Highway Patrol trooper, and his friend, Skyler 
Fautin, were driving Wright's pickup truck and horse 
trailer on a dirt road out of Deep Canyon in Juab County 
when they encountered a white pickup truck parked in 
the middle of the road. At the time, Worwood, the driver 
of the truck, had exited the vehicle, but soon reentered 
and drove it to the side of the road to allow Trooper 
Wright and his truck to pass. Trooper Wright noticed a 
large wet spot in the road, a beer can, and later an ice 
cooler that apparently had been recently emptied. 
[*P3] Trooper [***2] Wright pulled his vehicle 
alongside Worwood's to speak to him. During the 
conversation, Trooper Wright noted [**1267] that 
Worwood, who was sitting in the driver's seat, had 
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Trooper Wright 
exited his vehicle to continue the conversation and 
testified that he smelled alcohol on Worwood's breath, n I 
Ail of these signs led Trooper Wright to believe that 
Worwood was likely intoxicated and could not safely 
operate a vehicle. Trooper Wright told Worwood that he 
would not allow him to drive until he had been checked 
out by a police officer. Worwood appeared to recognize 
that Trooper Wright was a law enforcement officer and 
complied with the request. Because Trooper Wright did 
not have a telephone or other means of communication, 
he instructed Fautin to drive Worwood's vehicle to a 
nearby dairy and call for an officer to respond at Trooper 
Wright's house. Trooper Wright then asked Worwood to 
accompany him there, to which Worwood agreed, and 
Trooper Wright drove him approximately a mile and a 
half to his house. There, they met an on-duty trooper 
who performed a field sobriety test, determined there 
was probable cause to arrest, and transported Worwood 
to the Juab County [***3] Jail where further tests 
revealed a breath alcohol concentration of .248. n2 
nl Worwood claims on appeal that Trooper 
Wright smelled alcohol on Worwood's breath 
only after Worwood was seated in Trooper 
Wright's pickup truck, but fails to challenge the 
trial court's finding that Trooper Wright smelled 
the odor of alcohol on Worwood's breath "after 
talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity" 
but before asking him to ride with him in the 
truck. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, P67, 63 
P. 3d 731 (noting that a trial court's finding of fact 
is conclusive unless appellant proves the trial 
court committed clear error and marshals all the 
record evidence in support of and against the 
finding). 
n2 The arresting officer testified that 
Worwood had a blood alcohol content of ".248 
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liters," which presumably means a level of .248 
grams per 210 liters of breath. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(c) (Supp. 2002) (renumbered 
as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005)). 
[*P4] [***4] Before trial, Worwood moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained from the sobriety test, 
claiming it was obtained by means of an illegal seizure. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that 
Trooper Wright had noticed signs of intoxication early in 
the encounter, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, 
and "after talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer 
proximity, Trooper Wright also smelled the odor of 
alcohol." The trial court also found that testing Worwood 
at another location was necessary because "it was more 
fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a 
location that would allow the officer to obtain accurate 
test results." The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding that under these circumstances Trooper 
Wright had a reasonable suspicion to execute a level-two 
investigatory detention and that driving Worwood to 
Trooper Wright's house was a reasonable extension of 
that detention. We agree and affirm. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P5] On appeal, Worwood claims that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) 
Trooper Wright did not have a reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to effect an investigatory detention and (2) 
when [***5] Trooper Wright drove him to Trooper 
Wright's house to perform the field sobriety test, the 
encounter became a de facto arrest for which there was 
no probable cause. We review the trial court's legal basis 
for denying Worwood's motion for correctness without 
deference to the trial court's application of the law to the 
facts. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, PI5, 103 P. 3d 
699. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P6] Worwood first contends that Trooper Wright 
did not have sufficient grounds to execute an 
investigatory detention. "It is settled law that 'a police 
officer may detain and question an individual when the 
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, P10, 112 P.3d 
507 (quoting State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 
1996)). Although the officer's suspicion must be based 
on '"specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences,'" it need not be supported by probable cause 
or even a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (quoting 
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 [**1268] 
(10th Cir. 1990)). In reviewing an officer's [***6] 
conduct under the Fourth Amendment, we consider the 
facts in their totality and '"judge the officer's conduct in 
light of common sense and ordinary human experience 
and . . . accord deference to an officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."' Id 
at PI I (alteration in original) (quoting United States v 
Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir 2001)). 
[*P7] Here, Trooper Wright effected a level-two 
investigative detention after seeing an empty beer can, a 
large wet spot, and later an empty cooler. He also noticed 
signs that Worwood was intoxicated, including bloodshot 
eyes, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol on his 
breath. These indicators, combined with the fact that 
Worwood apparently intended to continue driving, 
justify the reasonable and common sense inference that 
Worwood had been or was about to drive a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated. 
[*P8] Second, Worwood contends that when 
Trooper Wright drove him to another location to perform 
a field sobriety test he exceeded the scope of the 
investigative detention and effected a de facto arrest 
After commencing an investigative detention, officers 
must '""dilligently [***7] [pursue] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to 
detain the defendant.'"" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1132 (Utah 1994) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). Defendant correctly observes that an 
investigative detention may become a de facto arrest 
requiring probable cause when police transport a suspect 
to a new location. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 
US. 200, 216, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). 
However, while courts acknowledge that the precise 
point at which an investigative detention becomes a de 
facto arrest is not clear, an important factor in 
determining when an arrest has occurred is whether the 
degree of intrusion is not "reasonably related to the facts 
and circumstances at hand." State v Leonard, 825 P 2d 
664, 669-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We recognize the 
'"important need to allow authorities to graduate their 
responses to the demands of any particular situation,'" 
and the fact that we could conceive of less intrusive 
means to resolve a suspicion does not alone render an 
officer's efforts to resolve the suspicion [***8] 
unreasonable. United States v Sharpe 4n0 (rS 6~*^ 
686-87, 105 S Ct. 1568, 84 L Ed 2d 605 (1985) 
(citation omitted). Rather, we consider only whether the 
officer's failure to pursue such other means was 
unreasonable. See id. 
[*P9] We appreciate the concerns expressed by our 
colleague in his dissent and note that Trooper Wright's 
mode of investigation would be permissible only in the 
rarest of circumstances and that this case ultimately turns 
on the unique set of facts it presents, albeit on a sparse 
record. Upon review of the known facts, we cannot 
conclude that an off-duty law enforcement officer 
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exceeds the permissible scope of an investigatory 
detention when he transports a driver he suspects to be 
intoxicated a short distance from an uninhabited area to 
meet an on-duty officer for further investigation. Trooper 
Wright testified that he was returning from horseback 
riding in a pickup truck with an attached horse trailer, 
had no means of communication, and was not equipped 
to make a formal arrest. Trooper Wright indicated to 
Worwood that the detention was temporary and for 
investigatory purposes by explaining that he could not 
allow him to drive "until he had been [***9] checked 
out by an officer." Although Trooper Wright may have 
been able to perform a sufficient field sobriety test on 
Worwood at the point of the initial encounter in Deep 
Canyon and possibly to transport him to the Juab County 
Jail, it was not unreasonable for him to drive Worwood 
to a nearby location in the town to permit an on-duty 
officer to perform a field sobriety test and, if necessary, 
effect a formal arrest. Further, the trial court found that 
conducting the sobriety test in town would "allow the 
officer to obtain accurate test results." Worwood has not 
challenged this finding and has not alleged that the 
results of the sobriety test would have been substantially 
different if conducted minutes earlier. Finally, there is no 
evidence that the change of location significantly 
extended the encounter, and the record gives no 
indication that under these unique circumstances Trooper 
Wright was motivated by any purpose other than quickly 
[** 1269] and effectively resolving his suspicion that 
Worwood was intoxicated. 
[*P10] Accordingly, we affirm. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
[*P11] I CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
DISSENTBY: William A. Thome Jr. 
DISSENT: THORNE, Judge (dissenting): [***10] 
[*P12] I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
conclusion that this case presents merely a level two stop 
of reasonable scope and duration. 
[*P13] First and foremost, I believe that Trooper 
Wright made a de facto arrest of Worwood when he took 
physical custody of Worwood and transported him from 
the canyon where the initial encounter occurred to 
Wright's private residence. As a level three encounter, 
this arrest was illegal because it was not supported by 
probable cause. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, P36, 
63 PJd 650 ("A level three encounter involves an arrest, 
which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or 
lengthy detention that requires probable cause." 
(alterations omitted) (quotations and citations omitted)). 
However, even if Wright's actions created only a level 
two encounter, Worwood's detention was unreasonable 
in both its scope and its duration. See Salt Lake City v 
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, P10, 998 P 2d 274 ("[A level two] 
'detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessar> to effectuate the purpose oi the ^iup[ j " 
(citation omitted)). Wright's actions violated the Fourth 
Amendment under either analysis, [***11] and I would 
suppress all evidence obtained as a result of those 
actions. 
[*P14] The only competent evidence of the events 
surrounding Worwood's encounter with Wright was 
Wright's testimony at the suppression hearing nl Wright 
testified that he took Worwood into custody after 
observing his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Rather 
than perform field sobriety tests on Worwood at the 
scene, however, Wright transported him in Wright's 
private vehicle out of the canyon, onto the state highway, 
and to Wright's private residence n2 in Levan, Utah, a 
distance of "about a mile and a half." Wright testified 
that he believed that Worwood knew he was a law 
enforcement officer. Wright entrusted Worwood's 
vehicle to Wright's passenger, and the passenger drove 
the vehicle to a local dairy to call for assistance, and then 
to Wright's residence. 
nl The trooper who formally arrested 
Worwood testified at the preliminary hearing, but 
he offered only hearsay testunonv about the 
circumstances of Worwood's initial detention and 
transport. 
n2 The fact that Wright chose to transport 
Worwood to his private residence gives me 
additional concern. While it does not appear to 
have been a factor in this case, the transport of a 
lone detainee to a private residence, in an 
unmarked car by an off-duty officer, could 
present significant cause for alarm to the 
detainee, particularly if it occurred at night If the 
officer was an imposter, discomfort could 
escalate into grave danger. I do not believe that 
this is the sort of scenario that we wish to 
encourage by excusing Wright's actions in this 
case. 
[***12] 
[*P15] These actions represent a significant seizure 
of Worwood and his vehicle, and any reasonable person 
in Worwood's position would have interpreted these 
actions as an arrest. Accordingly, I would hold that 
Wright effected a level three arrest as soon as Worwood 
became aware that he was in police custody, that his 
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vehicle had been seized, and that he was going to be 
transported a significant distance for the purpose of 
being handed off to another officer. See State v. Leonard, 
825 P.2d 664, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Orme, J., 
dissenting) ("The accepted rule is that what might have 
otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three 
de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a 
reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's place would 
believe himself to be under arrest."); see also Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 
229 (1983) (characterizing the relevant inquiry as 
whether the suspect believed he was being detained). I 
would also hold that Wright's observations of Worwood 
provided only a reasonable suspicion that Worwood was 
driving while intoxicated, but not the level of probable 
cause required to make an [*** 13] arrest. n3 
n3 Wright testified that the only evidence of 
Worwood's intoxication at the time of his initial 
detention was his bloodshot eyes and slurred 
speech. He testified that he only smelled alcohol 
on Worwood once he and Worwood were inside 
Wright's vehicle. Accordingly, Worwood's arrest 
preceded Wright's observation of the smell of 
alcohol, and that evidence cannot be used to 
bolster the legality of Worwood's initial arrest. 
Even taking the smell of alcohol into account, 
however, I believe that Wright could only 
objectively be said to have had a reasonable 
suspicion of Worwood's intoxication. 
[**1270] [*P16] Wright's reasonable suspicion 
clearly justified some detention of Worwood for further 
investigation. However, Wright exceeded the permissible 
scope and duration of that detention when he transported 
Worwood to his home for performance of field sobriety 
tests that could just as easily have been conducted at the 
initial scene. "Officers must diligently pursue a means of 
investigation that is likely to confirm [***14] or dispel 
their suspicions quickly[.]" State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 
41, P12, 107 P.3d 706 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Wright testified that he could have performed field 
sobriety tests at the scene of the initial encounter, but 
chose not to for the sole reason of personal convenience. 
n4 The resulting increase in both the scope and the 
duration of Worwood's detention were therefore 
unnecessary and exceeded the legal boundaries of an 
otherwise legitimate level two stop. See id. at P15 
("Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to 
dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the 
stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay 
already lawfully experienced and do not represent any 
further intrusion on [the detainee's] rights." (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted)). 
n4 Wright, being off duty, did not want to 
"mess[] up [his] night" by incurring the 
responsibility for Worwood's potential arrest and 
its accompanying paperwork. Instead, he wanted 
to hand off the situation to a fellow officer. While 
I find this motivation understandable, Wright, 
having chosen to exercise the power of the State 
to investigate Worwood despite his off-duty 
status, owed Worwood the full complement of 
constitutional rights. I do not believe that those 
rights permit the scope or duration of a level two 
stop to be extended on the basis of an officer's 
desire to avoid the responsibility of otherwise 
necessary paperwork. 
[***15] 
[*P17] The majority suggests that Worwood's 
transport was also justified by Wright's motive to obtain 
more accurate results from field sobriety tests. 1 find this 
unavailing, as field sobriety tests are routinely performed 
roadside in less than ideal conditions. Further, such a 
justification would permit the routine "relocation" of 
drunken driving suspects to a jail or police station where 
environmental factors such as light, sound, and footing 
could be controlled. 
[*P18] For these reasons, n5 I would hold that 
Wright's actions constitute both a level three stop 
unsupported by probable cause, and an impermissible 
departure from the allowable scope and duration of a 
legitimate level two stop. Under either analysis, the 
challenged evidence must be suppressed and Worwood's 
conviction reversed. Accordingly, I dissent from the 
majority opinion. 
n5 I believe reversal is warranted solely on 
the basis of violations of Worwood's Fourth 
Amendment rights. However, 1 cannot help 
looking beyond the immediate case and seeing in 
the majority opinion a green light for the routine 
transport of drunken driving suspects on the 
flimsiest of excuses. In my opinion, today's result 
opens the door for ail manners of avoidance of 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. For 
example, the resulting ability to make an 
inventory search of a suspect's vehicle will 
provide a strong incentive for law enforcement to 
"smell alcohol" and transport the suspect and his 
vehicle, allowing them to make an otherwise 
impermissible search of the vehicle for 
contraband. 
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[***16] 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
